Imposing Liability for Oil Spill Clean-Ups in Nigeria: An Examination of the Role of the Polluter-Pays Principle by Olaniyan, Ayobami
Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-3240 (Paper)  ISSN 2224-3259 (Online) 
Vol.40, 2015 
 
73 
Imposing Liability for Oil Spill Clean-Ups in Nigeria: An 
Examination of the Role of the Polluter-Pays Principle 
Ayobami Olaniyan1 
Department of Public and International Law, 
College of Law, Afe Babalola University, Ado-Ekiti, Ekiti State, Nigeria. 
Abstract 
Oil spills lead to pollution of water and land in the surrounding environment. The health and the farmland of the people living 
around the area of the spills are also adversely affected. Numerous laws are usually in place to deal with the issue of oil spills 
but often times some of these laws are not totally enforced or the institutions set up to deal with the spills are inefficient. Oil 
spills cannot be left unabated. The problem of oil spills have to be dealt with in order to avoid the devastating effects of oil 
spills on the environment. In a place like the Niger-Delta in Nigeria where oil spills are rampant, an effective means of 
curbing the menace have to be thought out to deal with spills. Oil theft, pipeline vandalism and sabotage are the order of the 
day and thus, oil spills are a recurring decimal in the Niger-Delta. The question then is can the polluter-pays principle play a 
role in the prevention and control of oil spills especially in Nigeria? This article seeks to answer this question by examining 
whether the Polluter Pays Principle, an international environmental law principle, can act as a deterrent to oil spills especially 
deliberate oil spills. This paper examines the tenets of the polluter-pays principle, the deterrence theory, challenges militating 
against the prevention and control of oil spills in Nigeria and then relevant recommendations and conclusion as regards the 
role of the polluter-pays principle in preventing and controlling oil spills are put forward. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The adverse effects of a single oil spill incident are often immense and unquantifiable. One key effect of an oil spill is 
pollution of the immediate environment. The extent of pollution of that environment depends on the amount of oil spilled into 
the environment during that incident; the response made towards clean-up of the oil spill and the quantity of oil that reaches 
the surrounding land. The type of environment the oil is spilled into also affects the magnitude of the harm. For instance, an 
oil spill into a trans-boundary river would most likely cause greater harm than a spill into a bare land. Also, in a situation 
where several barrels of oil were spilled into the sea and the spill is not immediately curtailed or the oil well that exploded is 
not immediately capped, the liability of the responsible party is greater and the harm caused to environment is usually 
colossal.2 
 
The Niger Delta area in Nigeria is bathed with regular dose of oil spills.3  The causes of the spills there is often times pipeline 
vandalism or sabotage of oil installations. Operational oil spills also do occur there. Militants and oil thieves are usually 
constantly attacking oil installations often times to steal the oil and make money out of selling it.  The fact that the oil spill 
was either accidental or not is not the main issue here. This is because it is an established principle of international 
environmental law that the polluter should pay for the harm he caused to the environment. When oil spillages occur, certain 
issues arise which are very important: the need to identify the responsible party who caused the oil spill; the extent to which 
the polluter/responsible party is responsible for the oil spill; the extent of the damage caused to the environment and 
measures to be taken to prevent future occurrences of events of similar nature. The polluter-pays principle thus holds 
someone responsible for the damage caused to the environment and prevents a situation where nobody wants to claim 
responsibility for an oil spill. 
 
The question whether the polluter-pays principle serves as a deterrent to oil spills is very important. A key reason for this is 
that, there is a need to reduce and prevent the occurrence of oil spills in Nigeria and especially in the Niger-Delta region. This 
is because the devastating effects of oil spills on the environment are usually great and are not matters that can be treated with 
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2  A relevant example here is the Deep Water Horizon accident that occurred in the Gulf of Mexico in  
2010. 
3  For instance, Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited regularly reports on a  
monthly basis oil spill incidents in the Niger-Delta (Nigeria) on its website 
<http://www.shell.com.ng/environmentsociety/environment-tpkg/oil-spills.html> accessed 15 July 2015). 
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levity. The effects on Nigeria’s economy, human health and even the marine environment are weighty. Liability has to be 
established so that the person responsible for the spill is held accountable for his or her actions. Oil companies, ship owners 
and the government who are also involved in the oil business, are not left to enjoy the profits of the oil business, but they are 
also expected to take all necessary precautions to prevent future oil spills from happening. 
 
This paper is divided into seven sections. The introduction is the first. Section two discusses the nature and environmental 
effects of oil spills. Section three examines the basic tenets of the polluter-pays principle and its potency. Section four 
explains the deterrence theory and how it relates to the polluter-pays principle in the context of this research. Section five 
explains the challenges that hinder the prevention and control of oils spills in Nigeria. Section six wraps up this research by 
giving appropriate recommendations and section seven provides conclusion to this paper.  
 
2. Oil Spills: Nature and Environmental Effects 
2.1 Nature of Oil Spills: 
A scholar has defined an oil spill as ‘…the unsafe discharge or release of oil into the human environment, for example into 
water bodies such as oceans, rivers and seas’.4 This definition describes the nature of an oil spill. Oil spills can generally be 
categorised into accidental and intentional oil spills. Oil spills are accidental when they occur as a result of factors beyond 
human control or natural disasters. Examples of these includes: tankers colliding with each other or with a rock while at sea; 
accidents in shallow waters5 during extreme weather; fire accidents and explosions on board drilling platforms; oil leaks from 
oil installations; earthquakes and storms affecting oil installations, such as oil pipelines and oil vessels. Examples of 
deliberate oil spills includes: acts of war or vandalism of oil installations;6 discharge of oil into the sea from tankers (while 
washing-out their tanks) and from oil platforms into the sea. 
 
The three main sources of oil spills are: oil drilling platforms; oil vessels/tankers and oil pipelines. In Nigeria, oil is also 
spilled due to illegal oil bunkering activities. For the purposes of this research, the nature of the oil spilled is limited to crude 
oil that is, unrefined oil. This research also focuses more on deliberate oil spills rather than accidental oil spills. The reason 
for this is that, deliberate spills are found to be recurrent in Nigeria especially due to the activities of oil thieves. 
 
 
2.2 Environmental Effects of Oil Spills: 
One of the most important reasons why any oil spill incident is taken seriously and why the need to identify the responsible 
party or the polluter is very important is because of the effects of oil spills on the environment. Oil spills have adverse effects 
both on the environment and even on human health. Thus, a person should be held responsible for the consequences of his 
actions. Certain factors determine the impacts of oil spills on the environment. These are: the rate of the spill, the type of oil 
that was spilled, the location of the spill and the size of the spill.7 These factors influence the extent of damage caused to the 
environment. However, it has been observed that even a minor oil spill incident may cause serious harm to individual 
organisms and an entire population.8 Effects of an oil spill ranges from death of species of birds, fishes, marine mammals, 
marine plants9 and even disruption of the proper functioning of the ecosystem.10 Oil spills are also detrimental to tourism and 
they even put water supplies for drinking and industry uses at risk.11 
 
Oil pollution is a direct effect of oil spills on the marine environment. It is also a form of marine pollution.12 Oil pollution 
occurs as a result of discharges of oil into land and the sea such as through- oil spills either from ships, pipelines or even oil 
                                                          
4  Damilola Olawuyi, The Principles of Nigerian Environmental Law: Essential Readings (1st edn  
Business Perspectives 2013) 148. 
5  J Powell, Oil Spills (Franklin Watts 2002) 8. An example here is when a ship collides with another  
tanker in shallow waters. 
6  Ibid. 
7  JL Ramseur, ‘Oil Spills in U.S. Coastal Waters: Background and Governance’ (Congressional  
Research Service, 2 September 2010) <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/142741.pdf>  
accessed 29 August 2014. 
8  Ibid. 
9  J Powell, Oil Spills (Franklin Watts 2002) 12, 13. Apart from the effects mentioned here  
other economic effects result from oil spills. Effects like loss of profit to the oil companies involved,  
loss of revenue that the government could have generated from tax and other fees and loss of  
businesses that depend on the sea for their livelihood are also some of the effects of oil spills. 
10  JL Ramseur, ‘Oil Spills in U.S. Coastal Waters: Background and Governance’ (Congressional  
Research Service, 2 September 2010) <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/142741.pdf>  
accessed 29 August 2014. 
11  J Powell, Oil Spills (Franklin Watts 2002) 10-11. 
12  According to Article 1 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982,  
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installations. The consequences of oil pollution are catastrophic. Oil Pollution kills seabirds, fishes, marine mammals and 
even adversely affects public health when toxic substances are washed into the land.13 Apart from economic damage, oil 
pollution affects local communities in terms of loss of businesses and a decline in tourism activities. Oil pollution also leads 
to contamination of the environment.14 Finally, the shipping industry and associated industries also suffer commercial losses 
as a result of oil pollution.15 
 
3. The Polluter-Pays Principle 
 
3.1. Meaning and Importance of the Polluter-Pays Principle. 
Mann posits that the exact legal definition of the polluter-pays principle remains elusive.16  This implies that the principle has 
the potential to be interpreted differently. In simple terms however, the principle means that ‘…the polluter should bear the 
cost of measures to reduce pollution according to the extent of either the damage done to society or the exceeding of an 
acceptable level (standard) of pollution’.17 This definition places on the polluter, the responsibility for the cost of reduction of 
the pollution caused by his action(s).  Paragraph 4 of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
Guiding Principles18 which established this principle, further provides in addition to the above definition, that the polluter 
should ‘...ensure that the environment is in an acceptable state’. This indicates that the polluter should ensure that pollution is 
reduced to an optimum level and not necessarily eradicated. The possibility of total eradication of pollution is also implied by 
that definition.19 
 
From the definition given by the OECD above four key issues emerge: (1). who is the polluter?20 This question must be 
answered where an oil spill incident occurs in order to make the polluter responsible and in order to allocate cost as provided 
by the definition given above by the OECD. Thus, the person that bears the cost of the pollution must be known. (2). to what 
extent is the environment affected?21 This helps to quantify the damage done to the environment. By this process, monetary 
value can be attached to the damage. This process can help to know the extent of liability of the polluter. (3). Pollution 
caused must be identifiable.22 This proves that the polluter is responsible for that resulting pollution. (4). There must be a 
damage that must be compensated.23 This establishes that the environment has been affected and that there are provisions 
under the relevant laws that provide for compensation. These questions help to ensure that the polluter is liable for the cost of 
the pollution as provided by the definition of the principle given above. In essence, the core of the polluter-pays principle can 
be said to rest on the principle that ‘…it is the parties who generate pollution, not the others, nor indeed the government, who 
should bear the cost of abatement.’24 The importance of the polluter pays principle stems from the fact that it allows the party 
responsible for polluting the environment to take responsibility for his actions. It also allows for that party responsible for the 
pollution to be ‘...charged with the cost of whatever pollution prevention and control measures are determined by the public 
authorities, whether preventive measures, restoration, or a combination of both.’25  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
marine pollution is ‘the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine 
environment,…which results or is likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine 
life,…’. This definition encompasses the concept of oil pollution in the sense that oil (as a substance or energy) is 
discharged into the sea and it also has harmful effects on the marine environment. 
13  Lord Donaldson’s Inquiry, Safer Seas, Cleaner Seas: Report of Lord Donaldson’s Inquiry into the  
Prevention of Pollution from Merchant Shipping (Cm 2660) 24-26. 
14  Ibid 26. 
15  Ibid. 
16 I Mann and F Hare, ‘A Comparative Study of the Polluter Pays Principle and its International  
Normative Effect on Pollutive Processes’ (January 2009)  
<http://consulegis.info/fileadmin/downloads/thomas_marx_08/Ian_Mann_paper.pdf> accessed 30 August 2014. 
17  OECD, ‘Glossary of Statistical Terms’ (December 2007) <http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/download.asp> 
accessed 30 August 2014. 
18  OECD, ‘Recommendation of the Council on Guiding Principles concerning International Economic 
Aspects of Environmental Policies’ C (72) 128. 
19  OECD, The Polluter Pays Principle: Definition Analysis Implementation (OECD 1975) 15. 
20  J Thorton and S Beckwith, Environmental Law (2nd ed Sweet & Maxwell 2004) 14. 
21  Ibid. 
22  T Okenabirhie, ‘Polluter Pays Principle in the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry: Rhetorics or Reality?  
(CAR CEPMLP Annual Review) (2008/2009 Environmental and Social Issues in Energy Industry) 
<http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/gateway/index.php?news=30840> accessed 29 August 2014. 
23  Ibid.  
24  I Mann and F Hare, ‘A Comparative Study of the Polluter Pays Principle and its International  
Normative Effect on Pollutive Processes’ (January 2009)  
<http://consulegis.info/fileadmin/downloads/thomas_marx_08/Ian_Mann_paper.pdf> accessed 30 August 2014. 
25  OECD, ‘Recommendation of the Council on Guiding Principles concerning International Economic 
Aspects of Environmental Policies’ C (72) 6. 
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Moreover, in terms of liability for pollution damage26 caused on the territory or territorial sea of a contracting party, as a 
result of discharges from ships, the 1992 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (the 1992 
Civil Liability Convention)27 makes the ship owner at the time of the incident, responsible for the damage subject to three 
exceptions.28 These exceptions are that the ship owner must prove that the damage from the pollution- did result from an act 
of war or natural phenomenon;29 was caused by the act or omission of a third party done with intent to cause damage;30 and 
that the damage occurred as result of the negligence or other wrongful act of any government or other authority.31 No liability 
is placed on any other person except the ship owner.32  
Furthermore, the position under environmental and safety law generally is that the operator of the installation in particular 
bears the liabilities and obligations.33 However, the terms of a petroleum licence for offshore oil and gas installations in the 
United Kingdom makes liability of the parties involved joint and several.34 Liability from oil spills could also be criminal 
such as the imposition of criminal fines under health and environmental regimes following oil spill incidents.35 Offences 
relating to the environment can either be fault-based (for example, negligence) or based on strict liability.36 In terms of oil 
pipelines, liability may be criminal or civil depending on the cause of the spill. The following sections examine the 
international law perspective, international environmental law perspective and the Nigerian law perspective. 
 
3.2 International Law Perspective 
This perspective can be captured from the OECD, United Nations (UN) and the European Community (EC) point of view. 
The OECD37 formulated the polluter-pays principle and recognised it as an internationally agreed principle in 1972.38 The 
principle was formulated as an economic principle39 and was meant to allocate the cost of pollution control.40 The polluter-
pays principle is also recognised at the UN level in Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
(1992). According to the preamble of this declaration, the proclamations in the declaration were made while ‘...working 
towards international agreements...’.41 The significance of this statement is that the proclamations in the declaration do not 
constitute binding provisions but are based on recognised principles which remain important in order ‘…to protect the 
integrity of the global environmental and developmental system…’.42 This move portrays the significance of the principle as 
a fundamental principle recognised at a global level. Principle 16 can also be said to have reemphasised the meaning of the 
polluter-pays principle given by the OECD. It is noteworthy that, principle 16 does not make the polluter-pays principle 
mandatory for national governments to follow but rather it encourages them to utilize it.  
 
The polluter-pays principle is also recognised under the European Community Treaty.43 Article 191 (2) thus provides that 
‘union policy on the environment shall…be based on the precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive action 
should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay’. This 
article strengthens the stand of the polluter- pays principle at the European Union level. The polluter-pays principle or its 
variations is also given recognition in other environmental treaties such as: the International Convention on Oil Pollution 
                                                          
26  Article 1 (6) (a) of the 1992 Civil Liability Convention (CLC) explains this further to mean ‘loss or  
damage caused outside the ship by contamination resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from the ship, …’. 
27  Originally the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (the 1969  
CLC). 
28  1992 CLC, Articles II and III. 
29  1992 CLC, Article III (2) (a). 
30  1992 CLC, Article III (2) (b). 
31  1992 CLC, Article III (2) (c). 
32  ZO Ozcayir, Liability for Oil Pollution and Collisions, (LLP 1998) 214. 
33  S Shergold, D Beggs and S Boileau, ‘United Kingdom: Incidents at Offshore Facilities- Who is  
Responsible for Environmental Damage?’ (2010) 6 IELR 179. 
34  Ibid. 
35  Ibid. 
36  S Shergold, D Beggs and S Boileau, ‘United Kingdom: Incidents at Offshore Facilities- Who is  
Responsible for Environmental Damage?’ (2010) 6 IELR 179. 
37  Para 4, OECD, ‘Recommendation of the Council on Guiding Principles concerning International  
  Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies’ C (72) 128. 
38  J Barde, ‘Economic Instruments in Environmental Policy: Lessons from the OECD experience and  
their Relevance to Developing Economies’ (Working Paper No.92, January 1994) OCDE/GD (93) 193,  
5. 
39  OECD, ‘The Polluter-Pays Principle: OECD Analysis and Recommendations’ OECD/GD (92) 81, 5. 
40  OECD, ‘Recommendation of the Council on Guiding Principles concerning International  
  Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies’ C (72) 128. According to this paragraph, allocating costs  
means that the polluter bears responsibility for the payment of the costs of preventing and controlling pollution. 
41  Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992), Preamble. 
42  Ibid. 
43  Article 191 (2), Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the  
Functioning of the European Union [2010] C83/01. 
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Preparedness, Response and Co-operation (OPRC);44 the Energy Charter Treaty 1994;45 the Convention for the Protection of 
the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR);46 and Agenda 21.47   
For the purpose of illustration two cases will be discussed to see how international courts have treated the polluter-pays 
principle. The cases are: 
1. Commune de Mesquer v Total France SA and another:48  
The basis of this case was a contract to deliver heavy fuel oil to Italy. The contract was made between Total International Ltd 
(the 2nd Defendant) and ENEL (an Italian Electricity Production Company). Total France SA (1st Defendant) sold the oil 
required by ENEL to Total International Ltd, which chartered MV Erika (Oil tanker which carried the oil). In 1999, Erika 
spilled part of its cargo thereby polluting the Atlantic coast of France. Commune de Mesquer (the Claimant) later brought 
proceedings against the defendants at the Commercial Court, Saint Nazaire, seeking among other things, that the defendants 
should be held liable for damage caused to the claimant’s land as a result of the defendant’s ‘waste’49 and that the defendants 
should be held responsible for anti-pollution measures and clean-up. This action was not successful both at the Commercial 
Court and the Appeal Court. The claimant then appealed to the Cour de Cassation. At this court, the court considered that 
there was a problem with the interpretation of Council Directive (EEC) 75/442.50 Thus, the court stayed proceedings and 
referred the case to the Court of Justice of the European Communities51 for a preliminary ruling for questions under Article 
234 EC52 (former article 177 of the EEC Treaty).  
 
The relevant point that the court considered was whether, ‘…for the purposes of applying article 15 (c) of Council Directive 
(EEC) 75/442 which stated that, in accordance with the “polluter pays” principle, the cost of the waste disposal was to be 
borne by the “previous holders” or the “producer of the product from which the waste came”, even though the substance 
spilled at sea was transported by a third party, in this case a carrier by sea.’53  
Accordingly, the court held that ‘in accordance with the “polluter pays” principle, however, such a producer could not be 
liable to bear that cost unless he had contributed by his conduct to the risk that the pollution caused by the shipwreck would 
occur’.54 The implication of this judgement is that- the court recognises that the polluter-pays principle exists as a principle of 
law and that it has a role to play in allocating liability. This case also confirms that the polluter-pays principle is recognised 
both at the international level especially at the European Union level. The court here also advanced the polluter-pays 
principle in the sense that, it affirmed that the polluter must be seen to have contributed to the damage done to the 
environment. 
 
2. Raffinerie Mediterranee (ERG) SPA and Others v Ministero dello Sviluppo Econonic:55 
This case is based on a dispute pertaining to a site in Sicily which was set apart as a ‘site of national interest’. The reason for 
this was that, the site was plagued with various incidents of environmental pollution. The relevant local authority then asked 
the companies who were carrying out their businesses at that location to decontaminate the site. The companies believed the 
decontamination of the site would be too expensive for them so they brought actions against the local authority before an 
Italian Court. The Italian court later stayed its proceedings and referred questions concerning the interpretation of the 
polluter-pays principle contained in Directive (EC) 2004/35/CE56 to the Court of Justice of the European Union.  
The question asked was whether the principle as provided for under the directive and in article 174 (2) of the EC Treaty, 
excluded national legislation which provides that competent bodies can impose measures for restoring the environment on 
commercial operators because they are located around the affected area without establishing the link between the damage 
caused to the environment and the operators. The court held that, Directive 2004/35 did not exclude national legislation from 
presuming the link between the operators and the damage caused to the environment based on the operators’ location. The 
court held further that, in accordance with the polluter-pays principle, that the local authority in question must have tangible 
evidence that can justify the presumption that the pollutants found in the contaminated area is closely linked with what the 
                                                          
44  Preamble. 
45  Article 19 (1). 
46  Article (2) (2) (b). 
47  Paragraph 8.28. 
48  [2009] All ER (EC) 525. 
49  Referring to the heavy oil being carried by Erika. 
50  COUNCIL DIRECTIVE of 15 July 1975 on Waste (75/442/EEC). 
51  Now the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
52  Treaty establishing the European Community (Nice consolidated version): OJ C 325 ,  
24/12/2002 P. 0127 – 0128; OJ C 340, 10/11/1997 P. 0273 – (Consolidated version); OJ C 224 , 31/08/1992 P. 
0063 (Consolidated version) 
53  [2009] All ER (EC) 526. 
54  Ibid 527. 
55  [2010] All ER (D) 133 (Mar). 
56  Of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on environmental liability with regard  
to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage. 
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operators use in their activities. This case clearly establishes the cogent point that, as regards the polluters-pays principle, the 
polluter must be linked to the damage he is alleged to have caused.  
 
The above cases utilise the polluter-pays principle thus reaffirming the fact that the principle is an established principle of 
law. From the above cases and other oil spill incidents, it is obvious that the principle is one that applies after the damage to 
the environment has been done not before. Thus, the principle does not act in a preventive manner but it acts to remedy the 
damage that has been done. 
 
3.3 International Environmental Law Perspective 
The polluter- pays principle is one of the key legal and policy principles that have emerged from international environmental 
law and EC environmental law to shape the development of environmental law.57 These principles are seen to maintain a 
balance between development and the preservation of a healthy environment, as well as allocation of liability.58 The polluter- 
pays principle can be said to focus more on allocating liability. The principle wants polluters to internalise (bear) the costs of 
the pollution which is a result of their actions so that ‘…the cost of their goods and services reflect the true costs of the 
measures which primarily the state adopts to eliminate, reduce and treat the polluters’ emissions’.59 This statement boils 
down to the fact that polluters should bear responsibility for their actions. The polluter-pays principle also ‘…enables the 
state to charge the cost of rectifying environmental damage to the relevant polluter provided that the polluter can be 
identified’.60 The function of environmental law is to act as a balance between the emissions which pollute the environment 
generated by economic activities against the need of society for a healthy environment.61 Those emissions are then set by the 
government (or its regulators) at levels which are acceptable to the regulated (businesses and the public).62 Thus, the polluter 
pays principle, which is also an international environmental law principle helps environmental law to achieve the aim of a 
tolerable environment. 
 
3.4 Nigerian Law Perspective 
The polluter pays principle is also recognised under Nigerian laws. A major piece of legislation that specifically deals with 
response to oil spills is the National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency Act, 2006 (NOSDRA Act). This legislation 
contains provisions that embody the polluter pays principle. For example, section 6 (2) (3) provides that: ‘the failure to clean 
up the impacted site, to all practical extent including remediation shall attract a further fine of one million naira’. The above 
section thus makes a polluter responsible for cleaning up an impacted site and failure to clean up the site will attract a fine of 
one million naira. Other relevant laws and guidelines which make provision for the polluter-pays include: the Environmental 
Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum Industry in Nigeria (EGASPIN)63 and the NOSDRA (Amendment) Bill 2012.64 
Specifically, Paragraph 8.1 of EGASPIN directly makes a spiller responsible for his actions. It provides that ‘a spiller shall be 
liable for the damage from a spill for which he is responsible. Where more than one spiller is liable, the liability shall be joint 
and several’.   
 
In order to appreciate the polluter-pays principle better, two Nigerian cases are now examined. The cases are: 
 
1. Jonah Gbemre v. Shell65 
In this case, Jonah Gbemre (the applicant), claimed on behalf of the Iwhrekan community inter alia as follows: A declaration 
that the actions of the 1st Respondents (Shell Petroleum Development Company) and 2nd Respondents (the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation) in continuing to flare gas in the course of their oil exploration and production activities in 
Gbemre’s Community is a violation of their fundamental rights (including right to healthy environment) and dignity of 
human person which is guaranteed by Sections 33(1) and 34(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 
                                                          
57  S Wolf and N Stanley, Wolf and Stanley on Environmental Law (5th edn Routledge 2011) 14. 
Other principles identified here includes: the precautionary principle, the preventive principle,  
and sustainable development principle. 
58  S Wolf and N Stanley, Wolf and Stanley on Environmental Law (5th edn Routledge 2011) 14. 
59  Ibid 17. 
60  Ibid. 
61  S Wolf and N Stanley, Wolf and Stanley on Environmental Law (5th edn Routledge 2011) 14 6; S Wolf,  
A White and N Stanley Principles of Environmental Law (3rd ed. CPL 2002) 6. 
62  S Wolf, A White and N Stanley Principles of Environmental Law (3rd ed. CPL 2002) 6  
63  Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum Industry in Nigeria 2002,  Paragraph 8.1,  
‘Liability’. 
64  See sections 8-11. 
65
  FHC/B/CS/53/05 (November 14, 2005) Federal High Court of Nigeria available at  
http://www.ecolex.org/ecolex/ledge/view/RecordDetails;DIDPFDSIjsessionid=0373E91B7EBE66A17FCCA47AE
C57E3C2?id=COU-156302&index=courtdecisions accessed 22 June 2015 and 
http://www.ecolex.org/server2.php/libcat/docs/COU/Full/En/COU-156302.pdf accessed 22 June 2015. 
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and reinforced by Articles 4, 16 and 24 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) 
Act Cap. A9 Vol. 1 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004.66 The court held that the actions of the 1st and 2nd respondents 
in continuing to flare gas in the course of their oil exploration and production activities in the applicants’ community was a 
gross violation of their fundamental right to life and dignity of human person as enshrined in the Constitution.67 
 
In the case above, the focus was on gas flaring as opposed to oil spill. However, the conclusion drawn from this case is that, 
environmental pollution matters such as oil spill and gas flaring are frowned at by Nigerian courts.  
 
2. Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Ltd v. Chief G.B.A.  Tiebo & Others68 
In this case, the plaintiffs (Chief G.B.A. Tiebo and others) claimed that the defendant, an oil exploration company (Shell 
Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Ltd), on 16th January, 1987, negligently caused a major crude oil spillage of over 
six hundred barrels from its flow station and on its pipeline or other installations at or near the plaintiffs' village called 
Peremabiri. The plaintiffs commenced their suit on 6th June, 1988 at the Yenagoa High Court of Rivers State claiming 
against the defendant the sum of Sixty four million, one hundred and forty six thousand naira (N64, 146, 000. 00) being 
special and general damages for the negligence of the defendant (Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Ltd) and 
for allowing crude oil, which the defendant was mining, to spill into the lands, swamps, creeks, ponds, lakes and shrines of 
the plaintiffs.69 The plaintiffs sued for themselves and as the representatives of the Peremabiri Community in YELGA. At the 
trial court, the judge gave judgement in the plaintiff’s favour awarding six million naira (N6, 000, 000. 00) as general 
damages for environmental pollution of the land, river, ponds and lakes of the plaintiff and one million naira (N1, 000, 000. 
00) as costs. The defendant then brought an appeal before the Court of Appeal when they were dissatisfied with the decision 
of the trial court but their appeal was dismissed. At the Supreme Court, the Court affirmed the award of general damages and 
costs awarded by the trial court therefore finding for the plaintiff.70 The Supreme Court noted that there was evidence before 
the trial Judge that there was extensive damage done to the crops, farms, farmlands, ponds, creeks of the plaintiffs and that 
there was also evidence of widespread environmental pollution.71 
 
The above case also shows clearly that the issue of oil spill was not taken lightly against the appellant/defendant. The 
appellant was made to compensate the respondent/plaintiff in the case for the damage the appellant caused to the respondent. 
The polluter (the appellant) was made responsible for his negligent acts against the respondent.   
 
3.5 Legal Effects of the Polluter-Pays Principle 
The question whether the polluter-pays principle is precise enough to have legal effects have no clear-cut answer.72 
Moreover, it has also been observed that there are differences in the explanations of the purposes and application of the 
polluter-pays principle by different authors.73 The fact that, the polluter- pays principle is also a ‘principle’ which carries 
multiple meanings74 and give discretion to interpreters75 in a way that is different from legal rules, which are ‘…less subject 
to interpretation’76 adds to the confusion. Thus, identifying specific legal effects of the polluter- pays principle is a daunting 
task. However, the legal effects of the polluter-pays principle depend on certain factors-whether the principle is contained in 
soft law, hard law instruments, or national law and whether the hard law or the national laws instruments imbibe a 
‘substantive’ or ‘formal’ approach.77 
 
Soft law instruments embody those rules that are not binding per se but which have played important roles in international 
environmental law.78 These instruments ‘…point to the likely future direction of formally binding obligations, by informally 
                                                          
66  Ibid. 
67  Ibid. 
68  (2005) 3-4 SC available at http://lawaspire.com.ng/2014/07/the-shell-petroleum-development- 
company-of-nigeria-limited-v-chief-g-b-a-tiebo-ors/ accessed on 22 June 2015 
69  Ibid. 
70  Ibid. 
71  Ibid. 
72  N Sadeleer, Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules  (OUP 2002) 
305. 
73  J McLoughlin and E Bellinger, Environmental Pollution Control: An Introduction to Principles and  
  Practice of Administration (International Environmental Law Policy Series) (Graham & Trotman,   
London, 1993) 145. 
74  Descriptive principles, basic principles or general principles of Law which all have different purposes. 
75  N Sadeleer, Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules  (OUP 2002) 
307. 
76  Ibid. 
77  Ibid 312-333. 
78  P Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law (2nd ed CUP 2003) 124. 
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establishing acceptable norms of behaviour, and by ‘codifying’ or possibly reflecting rules of customary law’.79 The 
implication of inserting the polluter-pays principle in a soft law is two-fold: (1). It would not be legally binding.80 (2). Due to 
the inexact formulation of soft laws, the polluter- pays principle would not be seen as a normative principle.81 Moreover, the 
polluter-pays principle’s value will be of an interpretative nature.82 An example of a soft law that embodies the polluter- pays 
principle is the 1992 Rio de Janeiro Declaration on Environment and Development. 
 
Hard law contains legally binding obligations.83 The hard law formal approach entails that the polluter-pays principle is 
provided for in the ‘operative provisions’ of a convention.84 When the words used in the convention make the provision 
binding upon the parties, this constitutes the substantive approach.85 It has been observed that, neither the form nor type of an 
instrument dictates the legal status of the polluter-pays principle.86 The polluter-pays principle can be found either in the 
preamble87 or in operative provisions of a convention.88 A principle such as the polluter-pays principle would attain a 
normative status only to the extent to which the principle is affirmed by an operative provision of a convention.89 The 
recognition given to the principle in the preamble is only to inform the precise rules contained in the operative part.90   
As regards national laws, the effect of the polluter-pays principle will be the same as above. That is, when the polluter-pays 
principle is contained in a national law that is a soft law, the principle will not be binding.91 Where, however, it is contained 
in a national law, which is hard law, its provision would be binding on the parties involved.  The formal approach here will 
be for national legislators to insert the polluter-pays principle into their framework laws.92 Thus, it is advocated that the 
polluter-pays principle should be contained in hard laws in Nigeria so that the principle would have binding effect on 
polluters.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
4. The Deterrence Theory 
Deterrence entails ‘the act of making someone decide not to do something: the act of preventing a particular act or behaviour 
from happening’.93 Deterrence is not a new idea.94 It is an idea that has been discussed in academic writings since the 18th 
century.95 Deterrence theory postulates that people will commit a crime if it gratifies them and the experience of crime is 
beneficial.96 This suggests that criminals or violators would engage in acts they believe would be of great benefit to them. 
The concept of deterrence is held to be based on the notion that people consciously try to avoid pain and seek pleasure.97 
Therefore, individuals will engage less in activities such as crime if the outcome of the crime would cause them pain. This 
perspective also suggests that crime rate would be at its lowest in places where offending evokes the most ‘pain’ (or costs) 
and it at its highest in places where offending brings the most pleasure.98 Deterrence occurs when people do not commit 
crimes because of fear of the costs or unpleasant consequences that will be imposed on them. The deterrence effect is ‘how 
much crime is saved through the threat and application of criminal punishments’.99  
 
There are two main theories of deterrence namely: (1). General Deterrence and (2). Specific Deterrence. General deterrence 
is said to occur in a situation when we punish an offender so that other people do not go into crime.100 Thus, an example is 
                                                          
79  Ibid. 
80  N Sadeleer, Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (OUP 2002) 312. 
81  N Sadeleer, Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (OUP 2002) 312. 
82  Ibid 313. 
83  P Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law (2nd ed CUP 2003). 
84  N Sadeleer, Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (OUP 2002) 313. 
85  Ibid. 
86  Ibid. 
87  Ibid 314. Example here is in the preamble of the 1990 International Convention on Oil pollution  
Preparedness, Response and Co-operation (OPRC): ‘…taking account of the "polluter pays" principle as a general 
principle of international environmental law…’. 
88  N Sadeleer, Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (OUP 2002)  
314. 
89  Ibid.  
90  Ibid. 
91  Ibid 329. 
92  Ibid 330. 
93  Merriam Webster Dictionary, ‘Deterrence’ http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/deterrence  
accessed 25 October 2014. 
94  Aaron Chalfin and Justin McCrary, ‘Criminal Deterrence: A Review of the Literature’, (2014) 
 http://eml.berkeley.edu/~jmccrary/chalfin_mccrary2014.pdf  accessed 25 October 2014. 
95  Ibid. 
96  Daniel Nagin, ‘Deterrence: Scaring Offenders Straight’ http://www.sagepub.com/upm-      
  data/40354_4.pdf accessed 25 October 2014. 
97  Ibid. 
98  Ibid. 
99  Ibid. 
100  Ibid. 
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made of offenders so that other people in the society can see that crime does not pay. An important point to note about 
general deterrence is that, its effects are potentially general in the sense that if this deterrence works, it is a very efficient and 
cost effective way of controlling crime.101 A limited number of offenders are punished here so that a whole lot of other 
potential offenders are persuaded not to break the law.102 Specific deterrence (also sometimes called special deterrence) on 
the other hand, is when the deterrence effect is specific to the individual being punished.103 For example, ‘Ade’ is punished 
so that Ade will not recidivate. Thus, the deterrent effect is specific to Ade who is being punished.104 
 
In relation to oil spill cases, it is submitted that the two theories of deterrence identified above should be considered when 
utilising the polluter-pays principle to impose liability in the prevention and control of oil spills in Nigeria. The reasoning 
behind this submission is that after examining the essence of the polluter-pays principle, one can safely conclude that in order 
to have an effective principle, both the individual and the group of individuals involved in oil spill cases need to be deterred 
so that others can learn from their mistakes. 
 
4.1 Relationship between the Polluter-Pays Principle and Oil Spills 
From the discussion so far, it is obvious that there is a connection between the polluter-pays principle and oil spills. The link 
between both is not one that is so glaring that one can easily identify. Both concepts can be said to relate at the point of 
liability. That is, they meet at the point where the polluter has been identified and he is deemed liable for his actions 
committed against the environment. The polluter-pays principle functions after the happening of an oil spill. In essence, the 
polluter-pays principle becomes relevant after an oil spill occurs. The polluter-pays principle helps to pin-point who bears 
responsibility when oil spills occur. Oil pollution also acts as a linkage between the polluter pays-principle and oil spills. Oil 
spills leads to oil pollution while the polluter-pays principle identifies the responsible party that caused the spill which led to 
the oil pollution. 
 
4.2 Prevention of Oil Spills in the Future by the Polluter-Pays Principle:  
The subject of the analysis here deals with the all-important issue whether the polluter-pays principle would deter oil spills 
from happening. From the discussion so far, especially about the nature of the polluter pays principle, the conclusion is that 
the polluter-pays principle at its present state, cannot act as a deterrent to oil spills in the future except certain steps are taken 
to make the principle more efficient in acting as a deterrent to oil spills. A look at prominent oil spill incidents will also 
indicate that the existence of the principle does not deter oil spills from happening. 
 
The principle of deterrence is based on the ‘…effect that the prospect of having to pay damages will have on the behaviour of 
similarly situated parties in the future (not just on the behaviour of the defendant at hand).’105  This implies that when 
potential polluters know that they have to pay certain amount of money as damages for their actions, they would not engage 
in such actions. The question then is as regards oil spill cases, have oil companies or vessel owners changed their behaviour 
overtime since they know that they would pay heavy damages as a result of oil spills that result from their activities or 
activities of their companies? The answer to this question is not really straightforward. The reason is that several factors often 
influence events that result into oil spills. These factors are not normally due to deliberate actions of the individuals or 
companies involved. This is not the case with deliberate oil spills such as deliberate destruction of pipelines during a war, 
sabotage or pipeline vandalization.  
 
In some other cases, events that lead to the major oil spills are caused as a result of accidents, which are not predictable. 
Negligence or the quest of oil executives to get the job done at all cost may not be ruled out as main reasons behind oil spills. 
Examples of oil spill incidents in Nigeria include: Bonga (2011)106, GOCON’s Escarvous (1978); Idoho (1998); Shell 
Petroleum Development Company (SPDC)’s Forcados Terminal (1978); and Texaco Funiwa 5-Blowout (1980)107. Popular 
foreign oil spill events include: Torrey Canyon, United Kingdom (1967); Amoco Cadiz, France (1978); Exxon Valdez, 
United States (1989); Sea Empress, United Kingdom (1996); the Ekofisk Field, Norway (1977); Ixtoc I, Mexico (1979) and 
the Deepwater Horizon, United States (2010).  
                                                          
101  Ibid. 
102  Ibid. 
103  Ibid. 
104  The deterrent effect here is personal to the person being punished. 
105  M Polinsky and S Shavell, ‘Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis’ (1998) 3 Harvard Law Review  
877. 
106  Adedayo Ojo, ‘Bonga, Endeavour & Macondo’ <http://africaoilgasreport.com/2012/05/opinion/bonga- 
  endeavour-macondo/> accessed 5 May 2015. 
107  Peter C. Nwilo and Olusegun T. Badejo, ‘Impacts and Management of  Oil Spill Pollution along the  
Nigerian Coastal Areas’ <https://www.fig.net/pub/figpub/pub36/chapters/chapter_8.pdf> accessed 3 December 
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Oil spill incidents can either be caused by deliberate acts or by accidents.  Oil companies and vessel owners may be deterred 
from carrying out deliberate spills when they know that the consequences of their actions will result in heavy fines and 
punitive actions being taken against them. Thus, other companies would be forced to review their oil spill response 
capabilities in order not to fall into the trap of being caught-up in the high cost of responding to an oil spill disasters in the 
future. This may also make companies intending to go into new frontiers such as the arctic region to rethink their steps or 
brace up, financially and technologically in order to meet up with the challenges of exploring those new frontiers so as to 
avoid oil spills.  
 
In summary, it can be stated that for oil spills to be deterred in the future, the polluter-pays principle must be strengthened in 
order for it to be an efficient deterrent tool in preventing oil spills. Some recommendations would be made to this effect in a 
later section of this article. A discussion on the need for liability caps108 is also relevant here. It may be argued that there 
should be unlimited liability regime in place in oil spill cases but a counter-argument that may be put forward in support of 
financial caps or liability cap is that unlimited liability would increase the operating costs for ship owners and operators. 
Also, it may be argued that unlimited liability could also make the business environment in which oil companies operate to 
be difficult. 
However, whichever way one looks at it, it has been observed that: 
‘…to achieve appropriate deterrence, injurers, should be made to pay 
for the harm their conduct generates, not less, not more. If injurers pay  
less than for the harm they cause, underdeterrence may result- that is,  
precautions may be inadequate, product prices may be too low, and  
risk-producing activities may be excessive. Conversely, if injurers are  
made to pay more than for the harm they cause, wasteful precautions  
may be taken, product prices may be undesirably curtailed.’109 
 
In essence, wherever the polluter-pays principle is inserted or utilised, especially in cases related to oil spills, it must seek to 
achieve its aim- to make the responsible party bear responsibility for his actions. 
 
5. Challenges Hindering the Imposition of Liability for Oil Spill Clean-Ups in Nigeria. 
The efficacy of the polluter-pays principle in preventing and controlling oil spills in Nigeria is called to question by the 
various challenges that would be analysed afterwards. This is particularly the case with challenges like vandalism and 
sabotage where the perpetrators of these acts are not identifiable. The polluter-pays principle will not be relevant or even 
practicable at that point because liability cannot be placed on anyone.  
 
5.1 Lack of Effective Penalties and Sanctions for Violations of Environmental Laws 
It is observed that ‘without real consequences for environmental violations, there is no incentive for multinational 
corporations to respect the environment in which they operate’.110 This observation is valid. The tendency for organisations 
and individuals to carry out illegal and substandard operations when they know that there are little or no consequences for 
their actions is very high. A clear example is the indictment by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) which 
reported that in Ogoniland (Rivers State) industry best practices were not applied in the control, maintenance and 
decommissioning of oilfield infrastructure and that even Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC)’s own procedure in 
these areas were not applied thus this creating public safety issues.111 Assuming relevant sanctions and penalties were 
implemented against SPDC and other violators of environmental laws and other relevant laws, the degradation and damage 
caused to the Niger-Delta environment would not be as severe as reported by UNEP in its Environmental Assessment Report 
on Ogoniland.112 
 
5.2 Lack of a Comprehensive Oil Spill Clean-Up Law 
                                                          
108  A liability cap or financial cap limits the liability of the responsible party to a stipulated amount. 
109  M Polinsky and S Shavell, ‘Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis’ (1998) 3 Harvard Law Review  
873. 
110  Barisere Konne, Inadequate Monitoring and Enforcement in the Nigerian Oil Industry: The Case of  
Shell and Ogoni Land’ (2014) 47 Cornell International Law Journal 196. 
111  United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), ‘Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland:  
Executive Summary’ (2011) < http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/OEA/UNEP_OEA.pdf> accessed 2 July, 
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112  United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), ‘Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland’  
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The problem of oil spill prevention and control in Nigeria cannot be solved without a comprehensive and adequate oil spill 
clean-up law. Although, extant laws113 have provisions dealing with oil spill clean-ups, these provisions are scattered all over. 
For instance, certain provisions relating to clean-ups are contained in the EGASPIN114 while the NOSDRA Act115 also has 
provisions relating to clean-ups contained in it. These provisions should be harmonised, revised regularly and implemented to 
the letter for effective clean-up operations to be recorded. 
 
5.3 Insecurity 
This is a major concern in Nigeria and especially in the Niger-Delta as regards oil spill incidents. Insecurity is due to an 
increase in the deadly activities of militants and terrorists. Some authors116 have observed that insecurity in Niger-Delta is as 
‘…a result of resistance campaigns through the kidnapping of expatriates and demonstrating the inability of Nigerian 
Security Forces to stop attacks, as well as the sabotage of oil installations and the effective use of the global news media’.117 
The implication of this state of insecurity in the Niger-Delta is that oil installations and facilities are not entirely safe. These 
installations are regular targets of militants and vandals who damage the oil installations in order to syphon oil from them and 
make use of the oil. It is reported that Nigeria loses about 120,000 to 150,000 BPD (barrels per day) to smugglers118 due to 
the problem of insecurity.  
 
5.4 Inefficiency of Monitoring Agencies: 
General inefficiency, lack of adequate funding, technology and manpower are the recurrent problems faced by monitoring 
agencies. The National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) and the Department of Petroleum Resources 
(DPR) are two major agencies involved in dealing with oil spill incidents in Nigeria. It is observed that oil companies usually 
decide when oil spill investigations take place.119 Oil companies usually provide transport to the site of the oil spill 
investigations and they provide technical expertise, which the regulatory agencies such as NOSDRA and the DPR do not 
have.120 Specifically, NOSDRA is saddled with the responsibility of ensuring proper clean-up and remediation of affected 
sites of an oil spill incidences.121 Thus, NOSDRA is at the fore front of dealing with oil spill incidences while the DPR is 
given the statutory responsibility of ensuring compliance to petroleum laws, regulations and guidelines in the oil and gas 
industry.122 A relevant example here regarding NOSDRA is the Amnesty International report that oil spill investigations are 
usually led by oil company personnel and not NOSDRA.123 NOSDRA is reported to be usually notified by text or letter when 
an oil spill investigation will take place.124 It is expected that since NOSDRA is the main regulatory government agency 
saddled with the responsibility to deal with oil spills, it should take the lead in oil spill investigations rather than oil 
companies taking the lead in oil spill investigations.  
 
5.5 Inadequate Enforcement of Environmental Laws and Guidelines: 
This is a major issue when it comes to imposing liability on the polluter. Relevant government agencies do not carry out their 
roles adequately. Thus, provisions of the National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency (Establishment) Act No.15 2006 
and EGASPIN as regards liability of the polluter may not be strictly adhered to or enforced. The benefits of the polluter 
taking responsibility for his actions for oil spill incidents in Nigeria cannot be realised without strict enforcement and 
implementation of existing environmental laws and guidelines. 
 
6.  Enhancing the Imposition of Liability for Oil Spill Clean-Ups in Nigeria using the Polluter-Pays Principle: 
Recommendations on the way forward. 
 
From the forgoing discussions and analysis and especially bearing in mind the consequences of oil spills, the conclusion that 
can be drawn is that there is a need to deal seriously with the menace of oil spills in different countries and especially in 
                                                          
113  NOSDRA Act and EGASPIN. 
114  For example see paragraphs 8.0 ‘Liability, Compensation and Sanctions’. 
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Nigeria. Drastic and consistent steps must be taken by the federal government, oil companies and other stakeholders in the oil 
and gas industry. In order to succeed in combating the scourge of oil spills using the polluter-pays principle, this article 
makes the following vital recommendations.  
 
Stiffer penalties and sanctions for violators of environmental laws especially as regards oil spills must be put in place. There 
is the very high tendency that potential violators would think twice before they cause any damage to the environment through 
oil spills when they know that the consequences of their actions are grave. Moreover, the National Oil Spill Detection and 
Response Agency (Amendment) Bill 2012 (NOSDRA Amendment Bill 2012) should be passed into law. Section 8 (1) (d) of 
the NOSDRA Amendment Bill 2012 provides for liability limit for as much as N15, 000, 000, 000 (fifteen billion naira) for 
oil spill from any onshore facility and/or deep-water port. This kind of provision is encouraged and it is hoped that when this 
bill is passed into law, this provision among others would be effectively implemented.  
A comprehensive oil spill clean-up law must be in place for a successful fight against oil spill incidents to be recorded. This 
law must provide specific details on how to ensure that oil spill incidents are prevented or dealt with immediately after they 
have occurred. The law must have provisions providing specifically for the polluter-pays principle and it must in clear terms 
provide for environment-friendly clean-up processes. Details of the lead agency responsible for clean-ups in Nigeria must be 
provided in such law. Provisions dealing with the imposition of liability for oil spill incidents scattered in different 
legislations can also be harmonised into this single comprehensive law which is revised regularly to meet current best 
practices in the oil and gas industry. A step in the right direction would be the passage of the NOSDRA Amendment Bill 
2012 into law. 
 
The problem of insecurity in Nigeria and in the Niger-Delta especially must be dealt with so that the imposition of liability on 
polluters would be successful. Insecurity would make it difficult for the responsible party to be successfully identified and 
held accountable for the damage done to the environment. A state of security will ensure that relevant oil facilities and 
installations are well protected and those that eventually destroy such facilities are held responsible for their actions. 
 
Moreover, monitoring agencies such as NOSDRA and the DPR should be well funded and equipped to effectively deal with 
oil spill incidents. These agencies should have clear mandates and roles as regards oil spill incidents. In particular, NOSDRA 
must have the necessary manpower and technical expertise to monitor and deal with oil spill cases efficiently.  With the 
necessary tools and funding, NOSDRA will perform better as a regulatory agency. NOSDRA will implement the relevant 
provisions of the appropriate statute and make sure that polluters are brought to book.  
 
Furthermore, environmental laws and guidelines must be implemented to the letter for a successful imposition of liability on 
the polluter. Usually, it is not that laws providing for the imposition of liability are limited but these laws are not effectively 
implemented and enforced by the regulatory agencies saddled with the responsibility of enforcement due to corruption or 
lack of commitment to combat the menace of oil spill.  
 
7.  Conclusion 
This paper examined the role the polluter-pays principle plays in the imposition of liability for oil spill clean-ups in Nigeria 
and argues that despite the fact that the principle is essential and relevant to the battle against the menace of oil spill incidents 
in Nigeria; its enforceability is rather weak and ineffective.  Cases of oil spill incidents are still recorded almost on a daily 
basis in the Niger-Delta region of Nigeria thus, this calls to question the deterrent nature of the polluter pays principle and its 
continued relevance and application to oil spill incidents in Nigeria. The importance of a pollution-free environment cannot 
be overemphasised. Parties responsible for oil spills must be identified and held liable for their actions and they must clean-
up the environment and made to compensate those affected by the harm they have caused. For the polluter-pays principle to 
be efficacious in deterring oil spills in Nigeria the recommendations above should be implemented to the letter and lapses in 
the regulatory system set-up to deal with oil spill incidents in Nigeria must be constantly reviewed and fixed by stakeholders 
in the oil and gas industry. Moreover, there must be proper implementation and enforcement of laws relating to the 
environment especially laws dealing with oil pollution and oil spills. This would help early containment of the oil that is 
spilled and prevent greater damage to the environment. It is believed that if the polluter-pays principle is taken more seriously 
the occurrence of oil spills in Nigeria would reduce to a very large extent. 
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